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Unemployment insurance is an important and long-standing social 
insurance program in the United States. Created by the Social Security 
Act of 1935, UI pays benefits to 15 to 20 million claimants in most 
years, benefits financed mainly by payroll taxes levied on covered 
employers. Employer contributions deposited into state trust fund 
accounts at the U.S. Treasury are the source for cash benefit payments 
to claimants.
Unemployment insurance is often described as having three pri 
mary objectives. First among these is to "alleviate the hardships that 
result from loss of wage income during unemployment" (Haber and 
Murray 1966, p. 26). The cash benefits paid provide partial wage-loss 
replacement and help to maintain the income and purchasing power of 
eligible unemployed persons and their families. Payments typically 
are made to individuals who have lost jobs through no fault of their 
own, that is, those on layoff, and benefits are received for temporary 
periods. The second objective is to help stabilize the macroeconomy 
through the maintenance of aggregate consumer purchasing power dur 
ing recessions, when the production of goods and services declines. 
The third objective is to help stabilize employment by experience-rat 
ing of individual, covered employers. Employers who, through layoffs 
and other job separations, cause large payments in UI benefits then pay 
higher UI taxes than employers who initiate fewer job separations.
THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
In the United States, unemployment insurance features a blend of 
federal and state responsibilities. The states administer benefit pay 
ments and tax collections and determine most of the statutory provi 
sions related to those activities. There are also federal responsibilities, 
the most important of which charges the U.S. Secretary of Labor with 
ensuring the prompt and efficient administration of the UI program.
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Three tiers of benefit payments are provided. Tier one is the regu 
lar benefit program, which operates continuously and pays benefits for 
up to 26 weeks in most states. Regular UI is financed by state-level 
employer taxes. The second tier is the federal-state extended benefit 
(or EB) program, which may pay up to an additional 13 weeks of bene 
fits. This program, activated when states reach set rates of unemploy 
ment, is financed equally by state and federal UI taxes. The third tier, 
temporary benefits, becomes available through special federal legisla 
tion during recessions. The most recent temporary program, Emer 
gency Unemployment Compensation, paid benefits from November 
1991 through April 1994. Traditionally, such benefits have been 
financed completely from federal funds. This book is concerned with 
state-level financing, that is, the financing of regular UI benefits plus 
half of the EB benefits.
A unique feature of state UI financing in the United States is the 
reliance on experience-rating to set contribution rates for covered 
employers. Benefit payments are charged against individual employ 
ers, and higher payouts result in increased state UI taxes.
UI programs try to achieve their three main objectives through stat 
utory provisions and administrative procedures that specify coverage, 
employer contributions, benefit eligibility, and trust fund management 
practices. Coverage of wage and salary workers is nearly universal, 
encompassing those who work for private employers, state and local 
governments, and nonprofit organizations.
Regular state UI benefits for eligible unemployed workers are typi 
cally available for up to 26 weeks. Most recipients are on temporary or 
permanent layoff, but others (job leavers and unemployed labor force 
reentrants) may also qualify for benefits under certain circumstances. 
Weekly benefit rates reflect past earnings, typically earnings from the 
highest calendar quarter of a 12-month "base period" that ended before 
the onset of unemployment. In many states, base-period earnings 
determine the maximum duration of benefits and the weekly amount.©
States also set the employer payroll taxes that finance UI pro 
grams. The original authorizing legislation that established UI (Title 
IX of the Social Security Act of 1935) provided for a federal unem 
ployment tax (PUT) of 3.0 percent to be levied on the payrolls of cov 
ered employers. Also authorized, however, was a tax credit offset 
mechanism that allowed employers to take credit for up to 90 percent
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of the PUT (2.7 percent of payrolls) if the state established an accept 
able UI program. One requirement for having an acceptable program 
was that a state must establish an approved mechanism for taxing cov 
ered employers according to their experiences in paying UI benefits. 
The U.S. Secretary of Labor is responsible for judging the acceptabil 
ity of each state©s UI system of experience-rating; the Secretary©s 
responsibilities are discussed later in this chapter. In states with an 
acceptable experience-rating, employers could pay UI taxes into their 
state©s UI trust fund at a rate of less than 2.7 percent but receive the 
full 2.7 percent PUT credit offset. That arrangement provided a strong 
financial incentive for states to establish acceptable programs, and all 
states did this in the late 1930s.
The other 10 percent of the original 3.0 percent PUT (or 0.3 per 
cent of payrolls) remained a federal tax paid into separate federal trust 
fund accounts. The proceeds of this tax were originally used to finance 
UI program administration and the activities of state employment ser 
vices. The federal component of UI taxes was (and continues to be) 
levied at a single flat rate.
Experience-rating applies to the state taxes that finance regular 
state UI benefits and the state©s share of EB benefits. Originally, UI 
taxes were levied on total covered payrolls, but in 1940 the taxable 
wage base was set at the first $3,000 of annual employee earnings, to 
correspond to the taxable wage base under the Old Age and Survivors 
Insurance (OASI), or social security, program.
The state UI trust funds that receive each state©s UI taxes are main 
tained at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Trust fund balances are 
invested in the U.S. government debt and earn interest income for the 
states.
When a state©s trust fund becomes depleted, there also are provi 
sions governing whether it may borrow from the U.S. Treasury. Bor 
rowing was widespread during the mid 1970s and again during the 
early to mid 1980s. Since the early 1980s, the loans have carried inter 
est charges if such debt is outstanding for more than a year. (The fed 
eral statutes governing UI loans and debt repayment are discussed later 
in this chapter and in Chapter 4. See also Miller, Pavosevich, and Vro- 
man [1997] andVroman [1990]).
Such statutory and institutional arrangements governing federal 
and state UI taxes have persisted from the 1930s to the present. The
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federal tax is now 0.8 percent of taxable payrolls, and it is levied on the 
first $7,000 of each worker©s wages and salaries. Proceeds from the 
PUT go to three federal trust funds, to finance such activities as UI pro 
gram administration, the employment service, the federal share of EB 
benefits, and a federal loan fund for states needing loans to pay UI ben 
efits.
In 1985, the maximum PUT credit offset increased to 5.4 percent 
and has remained at that rate to the present. Since 1985, each state has 
been required to have a maximum experience-rated tax rate of at least 
5.4 percent for the UI taxes that finance benefit payments. This implies 
a gross potential (federal plus state) UI tax rate of at least 6.2 percent 
for each state.
Under the Social Security Act, the U.S. Secretary of Labor is 
responsible for the prompt and efficient administration of unemploy 
ment insurance. The Secretary©s responsibility is given concrete mean 
ing through a set of performance indicators which the states must meet. 
There are more than 40 Secretarial "standards" and "desired levels of 
achievement" pertaining to the administration of benefit payments, tax 
collection, and fund management. To have an acceptable program, 
states must achieve target levels of performance for these indicators or 
risk losing the PUT tax credit offset. This represents a large potential 
financial penalty, and it gives the federal government a strong lever for 
influencing state UI program administration.
Certain federal requirements affecting state UI taxes and trust fund 
management are relevant to the analysis presented in this book. Four 
that are important for later chapters are the following:
1. A state is required to have a taxable wage base per employee 
of at least $7,000, that is, it must be at least equal to the level 
of the federal taxable wage base.
2. A state is required to have a maximum experience-rated tax 
rate of at least 5.4 percent of taxable wages.
3. Monies held in the state trust fund account at the U.S. Treasury 
can be withdrawn for a single purpose, to pay benefits to 
claimants. This requirement is known as the "federal with 
drawal standard." The withdrawal standard has influenced a 
few states to establish their own reserve funds, in order to gain
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partial control over the use of UI tax revenues. Chapter 5 
reviews the performance of such funds in three states.
4. States that secure loans from the U.S. Treasury must meet debt 
repayment requirements. Chapter 4 studies state experiences 
in direct bond issues as an alternative to the use of Treasury 
loans.
Forty-one of 53 UI programs operated with tax bases above $7,000 
in 1996. However, the 1996 tax bases exceeded $10,000 in only 20 
states and exceeded $20,000 in just five states. For comparison, the 
1996 Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI; social 
security) tax base was $62,700. Due to generally low taxable wage 
bases, taxable payrolls represented only 35.2 percent of UI covered 
payrolls in 1995. The higher tax bases are found in the 18 programs 
with indexed taxable wage bases. 2 Chapter 3 explores the link between 
the UI tax base and state trust fund adequacy.
In more than half the states, taxes flow into state trust funds from 
two distinct sources. The first (and largest) source is the tax deter 
mined by the state©s system of experience-rating individual employers. 
States typically use three factors to set experience-rated taxes. First, 
most states have a set of tax rate schedules with higher rates in effect 
when trust fund balances are lower. Second, such states use an indica 
tor of the overall trust fund balance on a specific computation date 
(most often June 30th) to determine which rate schedule will be used in 
the coming year. Third, these states assign rates to individual employ 
ers by using an indicator based on each employer©s experience in caus 
ing the payment of benefits. Higher payout rates lead to higher tax 
rates. This institutional arrangement for taxation has been present 
since the founding of the state UI programs. 3
The second source of funds is often called a "solvency tax," and it 
takes effect only when the state©s trust fund has reached such a low 
level that there is serious risk of insolvency. A wide variety of sol 
vency taxes now exists in the states. Some are levied at a single flat 
rate on all employers, while others use an experience indicator to deter 
mine individual employer rates. Some states have a single solvency 
tax, while others have a schedule of such taxes with progressively 
higher tax rates applying as the trust fund balance reaches progres 
sively lower thresholds.
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Solvency taxes are part of a larger set of UI financing arrangements 
collectively known as "flexible financing." Flexible financing may also 
extend to a state©s UI tax base and to its benefit payments. An advan 
tage of flexible financing, according to its proponents, is that the state 
can then operate with a lower trust fund balance than it could if it relied 
on the traditional method of UI financing. Flexible financing is exam 
ined in some detail in Chapter 2.
FUNDING STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS
Advance Funding
The revenues that finance state UI programs come mainly from 
payroll taxes on covered employers. Taxes are deposited into state UI 
trust fund accounts at the U.S. Treasury. These accounts are the source 
for benefit payments.
The funding strategy followed by state UI programs is usually 
characterized as "advance funding" or "forward funding. (A second 
funding strategy, "pay-as-you-go," is discussed later in this section.) 
Trust fund balances are built up before recessions, drawn on during 
recessions, and then rebuilt during the subsequent recoveries. The 
funding arrangement implies that the program acts as an automatic sta 
bilizer of economic activity, that it makes larger benefit payments than 
tax withdrawals during recessions and larger tax withdrawals than ben 
efit payments during economic expansions.
This characterization of advance funding does not accurately 
describe developments during the recessions of the mid 1970s and the 
early 1980s. Pre-recession trust fund balances were not large in several 
states and were too low to pay UI benefits to all eligible claimants. 
Widespread, large-scale, and persistent state borrowing took place dur 
ing both recessions. However, during the 1990-1992 downturn, state 
trust fund reserves were generally sufficient to meet demands for bene 
fit payments without states having to resort to large-scale borrowing.
The adequacy of a state©s reserves during a recession depends upon 
four factors: 1) the absolute size of the" trust fund balance at the start of 
the downturn, 2) the size of the state©s economy, 3) the recession-
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related demand for benefits, that is, the severity and duration of the 
recession, and 4) the speed and size of response of taxes (and possibly 
the response of UI benefits) when reserves are drawn down. A concept 
that has proved useful for assessing state trust fund adequacy is the 
"reserve ratio multiple" (RRM; also called the "high-cost multiple").
The reserve ratio multiple is an actuarial construct that incorpo 
rates the first three of the preceding four factors (the trust fund balance, 
the size of the state economy, and the benefit payout rate). The denom 
inator in the RRM is the highest-cost benefit payout period in the 
state©s history, measured as total benefit payouts over a 12-month 
period and expressed as a percentage of covered wages for that period. 
The interstate range of high-cost percentages extends from a low of 
1.04 percent (in South Dakota between January and December 1964) 
to a high of 4.37 percent (in Rhode Island between January and 
December 1975). The highest-cost period for the United States as a 
whole was 2.22 percent (between January and December 1975).
The numerator of the RRM, termed the reserve ratio, is the year- 
end trust fund balance divided by covered wages for the year and 
expressed as a percentage. As the ratio of these two ratios, the reserve 
ratio multiple is thus a measure whose numerator incorporates infor 
mation on the UI trust fund balance and on the scale of a state©s econ 
omy (as approximated by covered wages), while the denominator is a 
measure of risk (the highest previous 12-month payout rate). In the 
past, some have advocated that states build trust fund reserves to levels 
that produce RRMs of 1.5, that is, levels equal to 18 months of benefits 
paid out at the historically highest payout rate.
As a measure of trust fund adequacy, the RRM has its critics. 
Many analysts consider the 1.5 value too conservative a standard and 
that a prudent state could function with a much lower trust fund bal 
ance and run little or no risk of fund insolvency.
Two specific criticisms of the RRM are often voiced. First, the 
high-cost period in the denominator is often so far in the past (January- 
December 1964 for South Dakota) that it may no longer be a relevant 
indicator of the maximum payout risk. Second, the RRM is a static 
concept and does not adequately account for the dynamic response of 
taxes (and perhaps benefits) when trust funds are depleted. A quick 
response can permit a state to function successfully with a smaller trust 
fund than that suggested by an RRM of 1.5.
12 The History of State UI Financing
While trust fund financing has been practiced since the beginning 
of unemployment insurance, there is no consensus on what constitutes 
an appropriate measure of trust fund adequacy. The recently disbanded 
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) exam 
ined funding in its February 1995 report.4 Chapter 5 of the report ana 
lyzes the funding situation at the end of 1993, using three solvency 
standards. Table 5.3 in the report shows the number of states meeting 
RRM solvency standards for multiples ranging from 0.25 to 1.75, 
based on seven different measures of high costs: the highest 12-month 
costs ever experienced, three involving the highest 12-month costs in 
the past 10 years, and three involving the highest 12-month costs in the 
past 20 years.
The ACUC recommended that states achieve an RRM of 1.0, with 
a state©s high-cost rate measured as the average of the three highest- 
cost 12-month periods in the past 20 years. The ACUC also recom 
mended that the federal government offer specific financial incentives 
to encourage states to meet advance funding goals, including paying 
higher or "preferential" interest rates when large balances (measured as 
RRMS) are achieved and lower interest rates on recession-related bor 
rowing when pre-recession balances equal or exceed solvency stan 
dards. 5 If implemented, the ACUC©s recommendations would improve 
the solvency of many state UI programs. It seems unlikely, however, 
that federal legislation to encourage solvency will be proposed, much 
less enacted, in the near future.
Pay-As-You-Go Funding
A second strategy for funding UI benefits is "pay-as-you-go" fund 
ing. This strategy stresses the response of the funding mechanism dur 
ing a recession-related drawdown.
There are two variants of pay-as-you-go funding. The first stresses 
the automatic responses of taxes and benefits, responses triggered by 
trust fund drawdowns. As the trust fund moves downward past set 
thresholds, a state©s UI law automatically activates responses that raise 
taxes and (perhaps) reduce benefits. Laws in Illinois and Pennsylvania 
include provisions that activate automatic responses. In fact, one 
forceful advocate of this funding strategy is a former director of the 
Illinois UI agency.6
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The second variant can be called "ad-hoc pay-as-you-go." It relies 
on a legislated response mechanism when the trust fund is low or in 
deficit. There is no substantial written literature that advocates this 
strategy, but it could be inferred if a state satisfied specific conditions: 
i.e., 1) limited reserve build-up and a low RRM after a long period of 
economic expansion and 2) the absence of automatic tax and benefit 
response features. In effect, ad-hoc pay-as-you-go funding would 
address the financing problem at the point in time when the problem is 
most pressing.
When the primary objectives of state UI programs are considered, 
the rationale for pay-as-you-go strategies seems questionable. Both 
the temporary replacement of lost earnings for individuals and the 
automatic macro stabilizing effect of UI are weakened if benefits are 
reduced during a recession. It would also seem questionable to 
increase employer taxes in the midst of a recession, when profits are 
already depressed. However, the strategy does offer a rationale for 
operating with lower trust fund balances than advanced funding 
requires. The automatic variant of the pay-as-you-go strategy, flexible 
financing, is examined further in Chapter 2.
In selecting the desired target level for a state©s trust fund, the big 
gest unknown is the size of the trust fund outflow to expect in future 
recessions. There is no easy answer to this question. Selecting the 
highest-ever past rate of outflows may not be useful. For example, 
decreases in manufacturing©s share of total employment and declining 
unionization are now widespread throughout the United States. Both 
unionized and nonunionized manufacturing workers and other union 
ized workers claim UI benefits at above-average rates. This may 
presage lower benefit-cost rates in the future. On the other hand, rely 
ing solely on the experiences of the past 10 years likely means relying 
on too short an interval.
The example of Michigan may be instructive for reviewing high 
costs in past periods. During the 10 years from 1987 through 1996, 
Michigan©s highest 12-month benefit-cost rate was 1.90 percent, in 
1991. However, the past 10 years have been unusual in Michigan, a 
state that continues to rely heavily on the cyclically volatile automobile 
industry. During the 50 years from 1947 to 1996, there were seven 
years when the cost rate was higher than 1.90 percent. The five years 
with the highest percentage cost rates were 1982 (3.72), 1958 (3.69),
14 The History of State UI Financing
1975 (2.87), 1980 (2.55), and 1961 (2.20). Each year is a recession 
year with a higher payout rate than in 1991. Thus, the highest-ever 
cost rate for Michigan was 3.72 percent, while the highest three-year 
average for the past 20 years (1977 through 1996) was 2.75 percent. 
Both cost rates are considerably higher than 1.90 percent, the highest 
cost rate for 1987 through 1996. It seems clear that experiences cover 
ing more than 10 years are needed to assess the likely recession-related 
costs for a state.
Reserve ratio multiples as measures of adequacy imply large abso 
lute levels of trust fund balances. The 1996 year-end trust fund bal 
ances required in Michigan, based on a high-cost multiple of 1.0 
combined with each of the preceding three high-cost rates (3.72, 2.75, 
and 1.90) were $4.0 billion, $3.0 billion, and $2.1 billion, respectively. 
The state©s actual balance was $1.8 billion. Because the absolute bal 
ance is such a large number (nearly $2.0 billion), some might misinter 
pret the degree of adequacy that it represents. Michigan©s economy 
had roughly $110 billion in covered wages in 1996. A 2.0 percent cost 
rate in 1997 would represent a one-year outflow from its trust fund of 
about $2.2 billion. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the 
$1.8 billion trust fund balance would drop to zero during the second 
year of a recession.
MAJOR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
IN STATE TRUST FUNDS
Aggregate trust fund balances totaled $38.6 billion at the end of 
1996. The aggregate balance had been $36.9 million at the end of 
1989, just before the 1990-1992 recession. While the dollar value of 
the 1996 balance was larger by $1.76 billion, it represented a smaller 
percentage of total covered wages and a lower reserve ratio multiple 
than the 1989 balance. The national RRM had been 0.87 at the end of 
1989 but was only 0.64 seven years later.
This section reviews the history of UI financing, with particular 
attention to the problems of the mid 1970s and early 1980s. Develop 
ments during the 1990s are discussed in the following section (p. 21), 
along with an assessment of UI trust fund adequacy at the end of 1996.
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Beginning with the establishment of UI in the late 1930s, there are 
four distinct periods of trust fund financing. Sustained and large accu 
mulations occurred during the earliest years. These accumulations 
were the result of lower benefit costs than originally anticipated when 
UI was established and of the effects of full employment during World 
War II. The aggregate reserve ratio (the total net reserves as a percent 
age of covered wages) reached its all-time peak, 10.4 percent, at the 
end of 1945. Modest absolute growth in reserves continued through 
the end of 1948, when the national total of $7.60 billion represented 
7.91 percent of covered payrolls.
The trust fund accumulations of these years were also the product 
of the strong macroeconomy associated with World War II. Aggregate 
benefit payments, which had averaged about 1.5 percent of covered 
payrolls during 1938-1940, averaged only about 0.5 percent of pay 
rolls during 1941-1945, with especially low payout rates during 1943 
and 1944. Despite large reductions in average tax rates (from 2.69 per 
cent of payroll in 1938 to 1.50 percent in 1945), tax revenues exceeded 
benefits in every year through 1945.
The second period can be called "the long slide." During the 32 
years from 1948 to 1979, growth in UI trust fund reserves lagged sub 
stantially behind growth in the economy. The aggregate reserve ratio 
declined sharply, from 7.91 percent in 1948 to 0.91 percent in 1979. 
Losses in reserves were concentrated during recessions, but accumula 
tions during economic expansions were generally modest. Conse 
quently, the aggregate reserve ratio was lower before each recession 
than it had been before the previous recession. Even during the long 
expansion of the 1960s, the growth in net reserves was no faster than 
that of covered payrolls. Thus, the reserve ratio, which had been 3.57 
percent at the end of 1959, was 3.46 percent at the end of 1969, despite 
the fact that aggregate reserves had nearly doubled, growing from 
$6.67 billion in 1959 to $12.64 billion in 1969.
Because state reserves were so large at the start of the 1948-1979 
period, the decline in reserves did not present financing problems for 
many states until the mid 1970s. Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania 
were the only states that borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to finance 
benefits during the 1950s and 1960s. These loans were fully repaid by 
the late 1960s.
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Substantial drawdowns of state trust funds occurred in the early 
1970s. The first states to require loans were Connecticut, Vermont, and 
Washington during 1972-1974, with reductions in defense-related pro 
curement causing especially high unemployment in Connecticut and 
Washington.
Large-scale borrowing from the U.S. Treasury first became wide 
spread in 1975 as the 1974-1975 recession caused financing problems 
for many states. Nearly half of all UI programs required loans during 
1975-1978, and aggregate borrowing totaled $5.5 billion. Moreover, 
the post-1975 recovery was not robust enough to restore trust fund bal 
ances fully by the end of the 1970s. Several debtor states repaid their 
loans slowly, and aggregate reserves totaled only $8.58 billion at the 
end of 1979. This balance was about $2.3 billion less than it had been 
at the end of 1973 and $4.1 billion less than at the end of 1969. The 
reserve ratio at the end of 1979 was only 0.91 percent, roughly one- 
fourth of the reserve ratio at the end of 1969 (3.46 percent) and only 
about one-eighth of the reserve ratio at the end of 1948 (7.91 percent).
The second period of substantial state borrowing occurred during 
the back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s. Because state pro 
grams entered the 1980-1983 recessions with historically low reserves, 
borrowing was even more widespread and on a larger scale during the 
early 1980s than during the 1970s. Between 1980 and 1987, total bor 
rowing was $24.2 billion, with four states Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania responsible for over 60 percent of the total. Aggre 
gate reserves reached a low point at the end of 1983, when the nation 
wide total was actually negative: -$5.8 billion. Debtor states brought 
in major tax increases and reduced benefits as they attempted to restore 
trust funds to adequate levels.
The six years starting in 1984 witnessed large-scale trust fund 
building, with the states adding more than $42 billion to net reserves, 
about $7.0 billion per year. This yielded an aggregate balance of $36.9 
billion at the end of 1989. Despite the growth in absolute reserve bal 
ances, the aggregate reserve ratio in 1989 was only 1.92 percent, 
slightly more than half of its 1969 level of 3.46 percent. Taking the 
highest-ever national cost rate (2.22 percent during calendar-year 
1975) as the high-cost rate gives a nationwide reserve ratio multiple of 
0.87 for 1989; this 1989 multiple has not been reached during the 
1990s.
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Thus, 1989 marks the end of the third historical period, a second 
period of substantial trust fund accumulations. While the absolute 
increases in reserves were impressive, the indicators of relative size did 
not grow nearly so dramatically. Compared to the 1948 reserve ratio of 
7.91 percent, the 1989 reserve ratio of 1.92 percent was about one- 
fourth as large. Nonetheless, during the 1990-1992 recession, states 
did not need the large-scale loans they had required during 1974-1978 
and again during 1980-1987. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, only seven 
states borrowed during 1990-1995, and just two had loans that were 
"large," i.e., more than 1 percent of covered wages.
Another contrast to earlier recessions is that the 1990-1992 down 
turn was unusually mild in most areas of the country. As a conse 
quence, the drawdowns on trust fund balances were unusually small: 
Net reserves decreased by $11.0 billion during 1990-1992, compared 
with $14.4 billion during 1980-1983. We shall return to this topic 
later.
A third contrast between the 1990s and the 1980s is that there was 
no substantial trust fund building during the economic expansion of 
1993-1996. The four-year increase in aggregate net reserves was only 
$12.8 billion, or $3.2 billion per year. This rate of accumulation is less 
than half the annual rate during 1984-1989. As a consequence, the 
aggregate reserve ratio for the economy only grew from 1.20 percent at 
the end of 1992 to 1.43 percent at the end of 1996, and the RRM 
increased only from 0.54 to 0.64. On a relative basis, national reserves 
were about three-quarters as adequate at the end of 1996 as they had 
been at the end of 1989.
The slow pace of reserve accumulation characteristic of the 1990s 
marks this decade as the fourth period in the history of UI trust fund 
reserves. Compared with the long period from 1948 to 1979, the pat 
tern of recession-related reserve losses and subsequent accumulations 
in the 1990s is broadly similar, but it is based on a single recession- 
recovery episode. Trust funds declined during the recession but were 
not restored to pre-recession levels during the subsequent economic 
expansion. A repetition of this recession-recovery pattern could lead to 
renewed large-scale borrowing. Since reserve ratios were so much 
more modest at the end of 1989, compared with those of 1948, the next 
recession may entail the large-scale borrowing that occurred during the 
1970s and 1980s. The slow reserve accumulations during 1993-1996
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and the potential for large-scale borrowing during a future recession 
are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
State borrowing from the U.S. Treasury is not necessarily to be 
avoided at all times. Temporary loans for cash-flow purposes, because 
of differing seasonal patterns of tax revenues and benefit payments, can 
occasionally occur without causing large or persistent indebtedness. 
Interest-free seasonal cash-flow loans have always been available to 
the states. Loans secured but fully repaid before September 30th of the 
same year are interest-free.
Since the early 1980s, however, longer-term indebtedness has car 
ried interest charges. If the debt is outstanding on January 1st of two 
consecutive years and has not been fully repaid by November 10th of 
the second year, an automatic debt repayment process comes into 
effect. On January 1st of the following year, 0.3 percent is added to the 
federal part of each employer©s UI tax obligation, i.e., 1.1 percent 
rather than 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 of earnings for each 
employee. The proceeds of the 0.3 percent penalty tax are used to 
repay the oldest part of a state©s debt. Even higher penalty tax rates 
apply in later years.
Because federal UI penalty taxes are levied at a flat rate, a state 
may prefer to make voluntary repayments with experience-rated state 
UI taxes. These must be levied as new tax obligations (not as with 
drawals from the state©s UI trust fund), and their yield must at least 
equal the yield of the federal penalty tax. Voluntary repayment can 
also be accomplished through a special assessment levied on top of 
regular employer state UI taxes.
Before 1981, debt repayment provisions differed from current pro 
visions in several ways. Two especially important contrasts should be 
noted: 1) loans did not carry interest charges and 2) automatic debt 
repayment through mandatory PUT penalty taxes was suspended by 
emergency federal legislation. In short, debt burdens before 1981 were 
lighter than at present. That the increase in the cost of indebtedness 
helps shape state attitudes towards debt is shown by their debt repay 
ment behavior. 7 Debts incurred in the 1970s were repaid slowly, but 
post-1982 debts were repaid rapidly. Post-1982 debts were often held 
for such short periods that no interest was due.
The faster pace of debt repayment since 1982 partly reflects the 
states© willingness to cut benefit payments while their economies are
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still in recession. Thus, one consequence of trust fund inadequacy is 
that legislation designed to improve fund adequacy typically includes 
benefit reductions as well as tax increases. 8 Another reason to encour 
age the states to build large trust funds is to avoid recession-related 
benefit reductions.
To help illustrate the link between a standard indicator of trust fund 
adequacy and state borrowing, Table 1-1 displays summary data from 
recent recessions of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The top panel of 
Table 1-1 shows reserve ratio multiples for the ends of the years just 
before the onset of each of the four most recent recessions, plus the 
multiples at the end of 1996. The back-to-back recessions of 1980 and 
1981-1982 are treated as a single, very serious recession. The top 
panel vividly illustrates the loss of reserve adequacy since the end of 
1969. In 1969, only one state had an RRM below 1.0, and 35 had mul 
tiples of 1.5 or larger. By 1979, 10 states had multiples that were nega 
tive and 12 had multiples below 0.50, while only 2 states had multiples 
of 1.5 or larger.
In Table 1-1, note how the reserve accumulations of 1984-1989 
changed the distribution of multiples. While only 4 states had multi 
ples above 1.5 in 1989, 17 others had multiples between 1.0 and 1.49. 
The number of multiples that fell below 0.50 decreased from 22 in 
1979 to 9 in 1989. When the multiples in the individual states are 
examined, the increase in the aggregate RRM between 1979 and 1989 
(from 0.41 to 0.87) shows the expected pattern.
The top panel of Table 1-1 also shows the decline in the distribu 
tion of state RRMs between 1989 and 1996. In both years, nearly all 
programs had multiples in the range of 0.0 to 1.49. In 1996, however, 
eight fewer states had multiples between 1.0 and 1.49 (9 versus 17), 
while while two more had multiples between 0.5 and 0.99 (24 versus 
22) and seven more had multiples between 0.0 and 0.49 (16 versus 9). 
More states had low multiples at the start of 1997 than seven years ear 
lier.
Although it may be obvious to most readers, there is a strong asso 
ciation between the level of a state©s RRM before a recession and the 
likelihood of borrowing during a recession. The lower part of Table 1- 
1 illustrates this association with data on state borrowing from 1974- 
1979, 1980-1987, and 1990-1995. The first row for each period gives 
the initial distribution of state RRMs before the onset of the recession.
Table 1-1 State UI Trust Fund Reserves and Borrowing3





















































































































Initial RRMs 0 9 22 17 4 0 52 
States with loans 430007 
States with "large"
loans 0200002 
SOURCE: All data on trust fund reserves and loans are from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor. 
a The 52 programs are those of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The Virgin Islands are excluded from the
table.
b "Large" loans are defined as the total borrowing over the indicated periods equal to 1 percent or more of total payrolls for a single yeai 
in the periods indicated, 1975, 1984, and 1991, respectively.
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The second row shows how many states in each interval needed any 
loan during the years indicated. The third row shows the number of 
states needing large loans, "large" being defined as total borrowing dur 
ing the entire period equal to 1 percent or more of the total covered 
wages for one year in the period indicated.
During 1974-1979, 24 programs borrowed and 15 needed large 
loans. The probability of a state needing a loan and needing a large 
loan was much higher for states with low initial reserve ratio multiples. 
All five states with multiples below 0.50 borrowed, and all five needed 
large loans during 1974-1979. Of the 21 states with initial RRMs of 
1.5 or larger, only two needed a loan, and just one needed a large loan.
Similar patterns appear for 1980-1987. Nineteen of the 22 states 
with initial multiples below 0.5 borrowed, and eight needed large 
loans. Only two states with multiples initially above 1.0 borrowed, and 
just one needed a large loan. Thus, states with low initial multiples 
borrowed the most.
Of course, because so many states had low and negative net 
reserves at the end of 1979, the scale of borrowing during 1980-1987 
was much larger than during 1974-1979. Loans during 1974-1979 
were $5.5 billion, or 0.94 percent of U.S. total wages in 1975, com 
pared with $24.2 billion during 1980-1987, or 1.77 percent of U.S. 
total wages in 1984.
Relative to 1974-1979 and 1980-1997, borrowing during 1990- 
1995 was small. The seven states that needed loans borrowed only 
$4.8 billion, or 0.22 percent of U.S. total wages in 1991. Note, how 
ever, that borrowing was again concentrated in states with low initial 
RRMs. The loan probabilities in the two lowest intervals during 1990- 
1995 were 0.44 in the 0.0-0.49 interval (4 of 9) and 0.14 in the 0.5- 
0.99 interval (3 of 22).
A vertical scan down the borrowing data of Table 1-1 shows a clear 
pattern of decreasing loan probabilities within a given RRM interval. 
For states falling in the 0.5-0.99 interval, the probability of borrowing 
was 0.86 during 1974-1979 (12 of 14), 0.59 during 1980-1987 (10 of 
17), and 0.14 during 1990-1995 (3 of 22). Another obvious pattern is 
the monotonic relationship in grouped data between the initial RRM 
and the probability of needing a UI loan. States can reduce the risk of 
recession-related borrowing when they have higher initial reserve ratio 
multiples.
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For additional insight into the lack of state borrowing during the 
1990-1992 recession, Table 1-2 provides comparisons of the increases 
in unemployment rates during recessions. It focuses on state-level 
ratios of three-year unemployment rates and it also gives the national 
medians and averages of three-year ratios. The main point is that state- 
level increases in total unemployment rates (or TURs, as measured in 
the Current Population Survey [CPS], the monthly household labor 
force survey)9 were unusually small during 1990-1992. Nineteen 
states actually had lower average TURs during 1990-1992 than during 
1987-1989, that is, ratios below 1.00. The ratios exceeded 1.25 in just 
16 states during 1990-1992, compared with 36, 32, and 37 states, 
respectively, in the three earlier recessions. The concentration of states 
with low increases (and even reductions) in unemployment rates dur 
ing 1990-1992, relative to 1987-1989, underlies the low aggregate 
unemployment ratio in Table 1-2.
A similar pattern appears in Table 1-3 when the changes in reserve 
ratio multiples are compared across the four recessions. Relative to the 
decreases in state-level multiples during 1990-1992, the decreases dur 
ing the preceding three recessions were two to three times larger. The 
national ratios decreased by 0.65 during 1969-1973, by 0.98 during 
1973-1976, and by 0.62 during 1979-1983, but by only 0.33 during 
1989-1992. During the four periods, the number of states in which the 
decreases exceeded 0.75 were 21, 34, 16, and just 1, respectively. Both 
Tables 1-2 and 1-3 clearly show that 1990-1992 was a much milder 
recession than its three immediate predecessors. This must be kept in 
mind in explaining why state UI trust fund borrowing was so infre 
quent and on such a small scale during the 1990s.
TRUST FUND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990s
Table 1-4 provides additional detail on individual state trust fund 
developments during the 1990s, giving the net reserves and RRMs at 
the end of 1989, 1992, and 1996. Trust fund levels and changes for 
these years span the most recent episodes of recession and recovery. 
To characterize the changes in state-level unemployment, the average 
unemployment rates for 1990-1992 and 1987-1989 are shown as a
Table 1-2 Average State Unemployment Rate Ratios during Recent Recessions8


































































SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S. Department of Labor. State unemployment rate esti 
mates for several smaller states before 1976 were made at the Urban Institute. 
a Calculations are shown for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
Table 1-3 Changes in Reserve Ratio Multiples during Recent Recessions3





























































SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S. Department of Labor. 
a Calculations are shown for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia.
Table 1-4 Net Reserves and Reserve Ratio Multiples by State, December 1989 to December 1996
Reserve Ratio Multiples
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SOURCE: Data are from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
a Alphabetically within Census division.
b States needing large U.S. Treasury loans during 1990-1995.
c States needing small U.S. Treasury loans during 1990-1995.
d NA = data not available.
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ratio. States are arrayed by census division and then alphabetically 
within each of the nine census divisions. Table 1-4 also identifies the 
seven states needing UI trust fund loans during 1991-1995.
Four aspects of these data are noteworthy. First, state-level 
changes in unemployment varied widely during the 1990-1992 down 
turn. While the national average unemployment rate ratio was 1.156, 
the state-level ratios ranged from 2.400 (New Hampshire) to 0.671 
(Nebraska). Second, the highest unemployment rate ratios were found 
in states on the Atlantic coast and in California. The New England and 
Mid Atlantic states had especially large increases in their unemploy 
ment rates; arranging the states geographically helps to emphasize this 
point. Third, the decreases in reserves and reserve ratio multiples were 
disproportionately large in the states with the largest increases in 
unemployment. Of the nine states where multiples decreased by 0.50 
or more between 1989 and 1992, eight had unemployment rate ratios 
of 1.345 or higher. 10 Fourth, RRMs decreased in 22 states between the 
end of 1992 and 1996, a period when trust fund building would have 
been expected. If we take the RRM as a gauge of trust fund adequacy, 
the position of those 22 states deteriorated.
The slow pace of reserve accumulation during 1993-1996 is note 
worthy and deserves emphasis. One way is to highlight developments 
in the 10 largest states, which accounted for 52 percent of taxable cov 
ered employment and 56 percent of covered payrolls in 1996." Five of 
the 10 had smaller reserve balances at the end of 1996 than at the end 
of 1989, and eight had smaller reserve ratio multiples. 12 Weighted by 
1996 payrolls, the average RRM for the 10 dropped from 0.72 at the 
end of 1989 to 0.32 at the end of 1992 and then recovered to 0.41 at the 
end of 1996. Compared with the national average RRM, their average 
was 0.15 lower in 1989 (0.72 compared to 0.87) and 0.23 lower in 
1996 (0.41 compared to 0.64). In 1996, only three of the 10 largest 
states had multiples that exceeded 0.50, while four had multiples below 
0.40. 13 These states were much more vulnerable to the risk of reces 
sion-related financing problems at the start of 1997 than they had been 
in 1990.
A second way to highlight the slow pace of reserve accumulation 
during 1992-1996 is to ask the following question: How long would it 
take to restore reserves to their 1989 level? Between 1992 and 1996, 
the national reserve ratio multiple increased by only 0.10 (from 0.54 to
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0.64), or by an average of 0.025 per year. At that pace of accumula 
tion, more than eight years would be required to achieve a national 
multiple of 0.87 (the 1989 RRM). This would imply an economic 
recovery lasting more than 12 years, or longer than any expansion 
since the establishment of UI in the mid 1930s.
Given the strong pace of economic expansion during 1993-1996, a 
substantial accumulation of reserves would have been anticipated. 
Annual benefit payouts during 1993-1996 averaged $3.8 billion less 
than during 1991-1992. Also, aggregate tax receipts increased sub 
stantially; the three-year average for 1994-1996 of $21.8 billion was 
42 percent higher than the 1989-1991 average of $15.4 billion. 14
What distinguishes the UI tax increases during the most recent 
period of recovery is their comparatively modest size. The analogous 
increases following the downturns of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982 
exceeded 100 percent and 60 percent, respectively. Based on earlier 
recessions, higher UI taxes would have been expected during 1994- 
1996.
While a detailed analysis of recent changes in UI tax laws lies 
beyond the scope of this book, there have been UI tax reductions which 
clearly slowed the pace of trust fund accumulations during 1993-1996. 
Kansas and North Carolina were especially aggressive in lowering UI 
taxes, but tax reductions have been widespread during the 1990s.
The slow pace of trust fund accumulations during 1993-1996 has 
obvious implications for state UI solvency. In particular, it implies 
that at the start of 1997, states were more vulnerable to the threat of 
financing problems than they were seven years earlier, i.e., before the 
onset of the 1990-1992 recession.
To examine risks of insolvency, a series of simulations was under 
taken (details are provided in Appendix A). The simulations used the 
relationship between decreases in state reserve ratio multiples and 
increases in average unemployment rates that prevailed during the 
1990-1992 recession. Historic patterns of increased state unemploy 
ment rates were then fed into this relationship to provide projections of 
trust fund drawdowns for recessions of differing severity.
Two conclusions emerged from the simulation analysis.
1. The absence of widespread financing problems during 1990- 
1992 is attributable to both the mild nature of the recession and
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to the comparatively large initial trust state fund balances. The 
states may not be as lucky in the next recession, for unemploy 
ment may be of greater magnitude.
2. More states needed loans when they entered recessions with 
their 1996 year-end reserve balances than when they entered 
with their 1989 reserve balances.
Based on 1993-1996 rates of trust fund accumulation, several states 
will start the next recession with smaller balances than at the end of 
1989. Other things being equal, the smaller balances caused by the 
slow pace of accumulations during 1993-1996 will cause increased 
borrowing during the next recession.
In conclusion, it is almost certain that states will enter the next 
recession with lower trust fund reserves (reserves as a percentage of 
payroll) than they had before the recession that began in December 
1989. To the extent that tax increases and benefit reductions would 
occur rapidly and in large amounts in a future recession, flexible 
financing would lessen the need to maintain large reserves before a 
recession. Chapter 2 examines flexible financing.
Notes
1. The most common arrangement bases weekly benefits on earnings during the 
highest quarter of the base period, but the weekly benefit is limited to a range 
defined by a minimum and maximum. A recipient©s total potential entitlement 
typically reflects his or her earnings during the entire one-year base period, for 
example, one-third of base-period earnings. The potential duration is then the 
ratio of the potential entitlement to the weekly benefit. The details of monetary 
eligibility provisions vary widely from state to state.
2. Of the 20 programs in which the taxable wage base exceeded $10,000 in 1996, 18 
had indexed tax bases. The other two were Connecticut and Massachusetts.
3. For a recent analysis of experience-rating, particularly on its effects on employer- 
initiated worker turnover and inter-industry cross subsidies, see Vroman (1996).
4. See Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995), Chapters 2 and 5 
and Appendix E.
5. These are recommendations 2 through 6 in Chapter 2 of the ACUC report. Sev 
eral of the ACUC recommendations on financial incentives that would encourage 
states to build large trust fund reserves can be found in Vroman (1990).
6. See, for example, the testimony of Ward (1987), director of the Illinois Depart 
ment of Employment Security, before the Committee on Ways and Means of the 
U.S. House of Representatives in December 1987. Her testimony stresses both
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the automatic financing features in Illinois© 1987 UI law and the need for each 
state to determine the level of reserves appropriate to its circumstances.
7. See Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997), Table 9.3, for a summary of annual 
debt repayment patterns from 1972 to 1994.
8. Legislation of the early 1980s in the states with largest debts almost always 
included both benefit reductions and tax increases. See Vroman (1986), Chapter 2.
9. The CPS estimates for small states are incomplete before 1976. Estimates made 
at the Urban Institute have been used where CPS data were not available.
10. Missouri, the ninth state, had a ratio of only 1.028. The simple correlation between 
the unemployment rate ratios of Table 1-4 and the 1989-1992 change in state 
reserve ratio multiples was -0.627. The correlation was much higher (-0.907) 
when states were weighted by the size of their labor forces.
11. The 10, ranked in descending order according to 1996 payrolls, are California, 
New York, Texas, Illinois, Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, 
and Massachusetts.
12. Note in Table 1-4 that only Ohio and Michigan had higher reserve ratio multiples 
at the end of 1996 than at the end of 1989.
13. Note California, New York, Texas, and Massachusetts in Table 1-4.
14. Annual data on aggregate UI benefits and employer taxes from 1938 through 1996 
appear in columns (10) and (8), respectively, of U.S. Department of Labor ET 
Handbook 394 (1995) and in later updates to that handbook.
